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ABSTRACT  
The Greek crisis was the deepest and longest ever recorded in an OECD country in the 
postwar period. The output declined by over a quarter, the disposable income by more 
than 40%, while the unemployment rate exceeded 27%. This paper explores the effects 
of the crisis on the level and the structure of aggregate inequality and poverty using the 
data of EU-SILC for the period 2007-2014.  The results show that inequality rose but the 
magnitude of the change varies across indices. The recorded increases are larger when 
the indices used are relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the 
income distribution.  Unlike claims often made in the public discourse, the elderly 
improved their relative position in the income distribution while there was substantial 
deterioration in the relative position of the enlarged group of the unemployed. The 
contribution of disparities between educational groups to aggregate inequality declined 
while that of disparities between socio-economic groups rose.  All poverty indicators 
suggest that poverty increased substantially, especially when “anchored” poverty lines 
are used. Substantial changes are observed regarding the structure of poverty. Despite 
an increase in the population share of households headed by pensioners, their 
contribution to aggregate poverty declined considerably, with a corresponding increase 
in the contribution of households headed by unemployed persons. These changes are 
starker when distribution-sensitive poverty indices are utilised. 
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1. Introduction  
The Greek crisis was the deepest ever recorded in an OECD country in the postwar 
period. According to Eurostat, between 2007 – the last pre-crisis year with a positive 
growth rate – and 2016, GDP declined in real terms by 26.4%5. A second feature of the 
Greek crisis, that distinguishes it from other deep crises, is its duration. Countries with 
similar or even higher declines in output, such as the US in the mid-war period, Argentina 
in the early 2000s or Latvia in late 2000s, started growing again after a few years 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Greece only recorded a modest positive growth rate in 
2014 in the last ten years. Naturally, such a deep and prolonged crisis is likely to affect 
both the living standards of the various population groups in absolute terms and their 
relative position in the income distribution. The present paper aims to provide a picture 
of the changes in aggregate inequality and poverty in Greece between 2007 and 2014 
(the last year for which information is available) using the data of the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), as well as an anatomy of inequality 
and poverty in 2007 and 2014 with a focus on the most important of the observed 
changes. 
Inequality and poverty in Greece in the pre-crisis years were studied in quantitative 
terms in sufficient depth, using a number of data sets, primarily Household Budget 
Surveys, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the EU-SILC 
(indicatively, Pashardes, 1980; Kanellopoulos, 1986; Lazaridis et al, 1989; Tsakloglou, 
1990, 1992, 1993, 1997; Sarris and Zografakis, 1993; Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, 1997, 
2000, 2006; Tsakloglou and Panopoulou, 1998; Papatheodorou, 1998; Papatheodorou 
and Petmesidou 2006; Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, 2000, 2012a, 2012b; Papatheodorou et 
al 2008). Regarding inequality, the main findings of these studies were that, unlike many 
other developed countries in recent decades, in Greece inequality was gradually but not 
continuously declining since the mid-1970s, that inequalities “within population groups” 
were far more important is shaping aggregate inequality than inequalities “between 
population groups” irrespective of the partitioning criterion (regional, demographic, 
                                                     
5 All references to Eurostat estimates are derived from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ or 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/ accessed in various dates in August 2017. 
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occupation or educational – with the possible exception of the latter) and that, despite 
its decline, inequality in Greece remained higher than in most EU countries.  
Regarding poverty, the findings of the existing studies suggest that when “relative” (or 
“floating”) poverty lines were employed, poverty recorded a modest decline from the 
1970s until the eruption of the crisis, while the decline was very substantial when the 
poverty line used was “anchored” in real purchasing power terms. In the earlier years, 
poverty was primarily a rural phenomenon, while in more recent years with the 
declining importance of the agricultural sector and the rise in agricultural incomes due 
to the Common Agricultural Policy, the elderly became the largest group in poverty, 
although they did not experience extreme poverty. Relative poverty in Greece was 
consistently found to be higher than the EU average, while there was evidence that 
poverty was, to some extent, “state dependent”; that is, once people were falling below 
the poverty line, they tended to stay longer in poverty irrespective of their 
characteristics (Andriopoulou and Tsakloglou, 2011, 2015) and considerable overlap 
could be observed between the groups of the “poor” and the “socially excluded” 
(Andriopoulou et al, 2013). Finally, the redistributive role of the state in Greece was 
limited in comparison to other EU countries, with indirect taxation being regressive, 
social insurance contributions almost neutral and direct taxation and social transfers 
progressive (Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, 1998; Heady et al, 2001; Kaplanoglou and 
Newbery, 2003, 2008; Papatheodorou, 2006), while in-kind transfers in the field of 
public education and public health care had a substantial progressively redistributive 
effect (Paulus et al, 2010; Koutsampelas and Tsakloglou, 2013). 
“Poverty” and, to a lesser extent, “inequality” were almost constantly at the forefront 
of the public discourse in the years of the crisis. The main claim made in this discourse 
was that poverty and inequality rose steeply during the crisis and that successive 
pension cuts led to the impoverishment of large segments of the elderly population. A 
number of empirical investigations can be found in the literature examining in depth the 
above claims, as well as the effects of particular policies adopted in recent years 
(Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Artelaris and Kandylis, 2014; 
Koutsogeorgopoulou et al, 2014, Mitrakos, 2014; Kaplanoglou, 2015; Katsikas et al, 
2015; Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2016). They use a variety of data and methods, some 
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use real data and some simulated estimates, while the observation period varies across 
studies and, hence, their results are not always strictly comparable. Nonetheless, they 
confirm that poverty rose during the crisis, especially when “anchored” poverty lines are 
used. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with data and 
methodological issues. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings of the 
paper, first, for inter-temporal changes in aggregate inequality and poverty and then, 
for changes in the structure of inequality and poverty, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
As noted earlier, the data used in our analysis come from the Greek data set of the EU-
SILC for the period 2008-2015. Since the income information of the participating 
households refers to the previous year, we denote our timeframe as “2007-2014”. The 
EU-SILC is a harmonised cross-national longitudinal survey, carried out annually in all EU 
member-states (as well as Norway and Switzerland). It is a truly rich data set providing 
detailed information on income, employment, health, education, housing, migration, 
social transfers and social participation, as well as socio-demographic characteristics of 
the participating households and their members. It is a rotational panel and each 
household remains in the sample for up to four consecutive years. For the purposes of 
our analysis, we use the cross-sectional information for the waves 2008-2015 (incomes 
2007-2014). 
The concept of resources used in our analysis is “disposable monetary household 
income”; that is the sum of monetary incomes of all household members from all 
sources after the subtraction of direct taxes and social insurance contributions. Despite 
its popularity, it is not entirely clear whether monetary income is the most appropriate 
concept of resources for distributional studies (Deaton, 1993; Sen, 1995), especially in 
turbulent periods. In order to take into account differences in needs of households with 
differences in size and composition, household incomes are standardised using the 
household equivalence scales used by Eurostat. These scales assign a weight of 1.0 to 
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the household head, 0.3 to each household member aged below 14 and 0.5 to the 
remaining household members. 
Changes in the level of aggregate inequality are measured using four indices. The Gini 
index, the Mean Log Deviation (MLD, also known as the Second Theil index) and two 
members of the Atkinson family of inequality indices for inequality aversion parameters 
0.25 and 0.75 (ATK0,25 and ATK0.75, respectively). These indices satisfy the standard 
axioms of inequality measurement (symmetry, mean independence, population 
invariance and the principle transfers). Each index of inequality corresponds to a 
different Social Welfare Function and is relatively more sensitive to changes in different 
parts of the income distribution. Of the indices used here the Gini index is relatively 
more sensitive to changes in the middle of the income distribution, ATK0.25 is more 
sensitive to changes close to the top of the distribution while ATK0.75 and the MLD are 
more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the distribution (Lambert, 2002; Cowel, 
2011). Further, MLD is “strictly additively decomposable”; that is, when the population 
is partitioned in non-overlapping and exhausting groups using a particular criterion 
(demographic, occupational, etc.) it allows the identification of the contribution of each 
population group to aggregate inequality as well as the identification of the contribution 
of disparities between population groups to aggregate inequality (Shorrocks, 1980; 
Anand, 1983; Tsakloglou, 1993). Hence, MLD is used for the analysis of the structure of 
inequality. 
For the purposes of poverty analysis, we rely on the use of the Foster et al (1984) 
parametric family of indices (FGT) when setting the value of the poverty aversion 
parameter to 0, 1 and 2 (FGT0, FGT1 and FGT2, respectively). FGT0 is the most well-
known index of inequality, the poverty rate; that is, the proportion of population that 
falls below the poverty line. FGT1 is the “income gap ratio”; that is, the share of the total 
income that would be needed to eliminate poverty. FGT1 is not sensitive to the extent 
of inequality among the poor (and, hence to the extent of extreme poverty), while FGT0 
is sensitive to neither the average depth of poverty nor the extent of inequality among 
the poor. Of the indices used here, only FGT2 satisfies the standard axioms of poverty 
measurement (focus, symmetry, monotonicity, ranked deprivation, normalisation and 
transfer; Foster 1984; Seidl, 1988). Although all members of the Foster et al (1984) family 
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of indices are “additively decomposable”; that is, they can identify the contribution of 
each population group to aggregate poverty when the population is grouped into non-
overlapping and exhausting groups, due to space limitations, for the purposes of the 
analysis of the structure of poverty we rely on FGT0 and FGT2. Unlike inequality that is 
a 'relative” concept, poverty can be used in relative or “absolute” terms6. Hence, when 
examining inter-temporal changes in the level and structure of poverty we use both 
“floating” and “anchored” poverty lines. The “floating” poverty lines used are those of 
Eurostat that set the poverty line equal to 60% of the median equivalised income of the 
contemporaneous income distribution. The “anchored” poverty line is the poverty line 
of the base year (2007) adjusted for the cost of living for each subsequent year. 
Last but not least, it should be noted that, following the practice of several international 
organisations, we applied “top and bottom coding” to our samples; that is, we removed 
a number of observations from the two ends of the distribution. More specifically, 
following the practice of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, we removed 
households with equivalised incomes less than 1% and more than ten times the mean 
equivalised income of the corresponding distribution. Almost all the observations 
removed - less than 1% of the sample – were located to the bottom end of the 
distribution and were negative or zero incomes. Most of the indices used in our analysis 
cannot be calculated in the presence of zero and/or negative incomes. Undoubtedly, the 
treatment of such incomes is not uncontroversial and one could safely assume that the 
number of households with zero or negative incomes is likely to rise in crisis periods. 
This was the case in our sample, too, but the pattern was anything but uniform. In fact, 
the lowest number of zero and negative incomes in the years under examination was 
recorded in 2013 at the peak of the crisis. 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 In other words, a population member may be unable to reach a particular fixed in time and/or space 
standard of living (“poverty in absolute terms”) or his/her standard of living is quite low in comparison 
with the reference population (“poverty in relative terms”). 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1. Inter-temporal changes in aggregate inequality and poverty 
Graph 1 presents the evolution that took place in the entire income distribution 
between 2007 and 2014. More specifically, it shows the distributions of equivalised 
disposable income per capita for both years in constant 2014 prices using kernel density 
functions. A massive shift of the distribution to the left is evident. According to Eurostat, 
the population of Greece declined by -2.4% between these years. As a result, the 
cumulative decline in GDP per capita during the period 2007-2014 is marginally lower 
than the decline in total GDP (-24.6% vs -26.4%). However, due to the fact that a very 
considerable proportion of the stabilisation effort relied on tax increases, the decline in 
mean equivalised disposable income per capita was substantially larger, reaching a 
staggering -39.9%7. The graph shows a higher concentration around the mode in 2014 
than in 2007 that, prima facie, could be an indication of a decline in inequality. However, 
many more observations are concentrated close to the bottom of the distribution in 
2014 than in 2007, operating in the opposite direction.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 In fact, despite the declining economic activity in 2008 and 2009, disposable incomes were rising in these 
years. If 2009 is taken as base year instead of 2007, the decline is even larger -42.2%. 
8 Note also that, for exposition purposes, both distributions are cut off at the annual level of 30,000 euros 
per capita (in equivalised terms). Naturally, the distribution of 2007 has a fatter right tail above this 
threshold than the 2014 distribution. 
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Graph 1.  Income distribution: 2007 and 2014 
 
 
 
3.1.1. Inequality 
Graph 2 depicts the evolution of the four inequality indices used in the paper, when their 
values are standardised to 100 for the base year (2007). In the first three years (2007-
2010), the changes in the indices are relatively small and not uniform – an indication of 
intersecting Lorenz curves.9 All indices decline between 2010 and 2011 and, in fact, the 
index that declines most is ATK0.25, indicating that the decline in top incomes was larger 
than the decline in the incomes of the rest of the population; probably the effect of the 
steep tax increases that affected primarily the top end of the income distribution. In the 
next year, inequality rose sharply according to all indices; presumably the effect of the 
                                                     
9 The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the distribution of income when the members of the 
population are ranked from the poorest to the richest. It depicts the relationship between the cumulative 
share of the population and the cumulative distribution of income. When there is perfect equality, the 
Lorenz curve coincides with the 450 line, whereas when all income accrues to a single population member 
it coincides with the lower horizontal and the right vertical axis. When the Lorenz curves of two 
distributions do not intersect, all inequality indices satisfying the axioms mentioned in the previous 
section would rank the one closer to the line of perfect equality (450 line) as more equal. When two Lorenz 
curves intersect, there are always inequality indices that can rank the corresponding distributions in 
different order. 
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sharp increases in unemployment and the lack of adequate social protection for those 
affected. Interestingly, between 2012 and 2013 all indices record a substantial increase 
in inequality apart from MLD that registers a very marginal decline – another indication 
of intersecting Lorenz curves, this time close to the bottom of the distribution. Finally, 
all indices record a robust decline between 2013 and 2014; probably the result of 
stabilisation in output and a marginal decline in unemployment in 2014 combined with 
specific policies targeted towards the poorest segments of the population in that year 
(income-related family benefits, a lump sum one-off “social dividend” to the poorest 
segment of the population)).  
Graph 2.  Inequality trends, 2007-2014 (2007: 100) 
 
 
All in all, between 2007 and 2014 inequality rose by 11.5%, 4.9% and 1.7% according to 
MLD, ATK0.75 and Gini. On the contrary, ATK0.25 records a very marginal decline of -
0.1%, implying an indication of intersecting Lorenz curves. Careful inspection of the data 
reveals that between 2007 and 2014 there was a decline in the income shares of the 
two bottom deciles by -0.6 and -0.1 percentage points, respectively, but also of the top 
decile by -0.7 percentage points and a corresponding increase in the income shares of 
the seven middle deciles (results available from the authors on request). 
 
 
95
100
105
110
115
120
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gini
ATK0.25
ATK0.75
MLD
 
 
9 
3.1.2. Poverty 
Graph 3 presents the evolution of the three poverty indices used in the paper using both 
“floating” (red lines) and “anchored” (blue lines) poverty thresholds when their values 
are standardised to 100 for the base year (2007). When floating poverty lines are used, 
the indices remain stable for the first couple of years and, then start rising until 2012 
but in a very different pattern. During this period, 2009-2012, the estimate of the 
poverty rate (FGT0), rises by almost 15% whereas the estimates of FGT1 and FGT2 rise 
by around 50% and 87%, respectively. Clearly, not only there was an increase in the 
share of the population falling below the poverty line but also a decline in the incomes 
of the poor vis-à-vis the poverty line (increase in the “depth” of poverty) as well as an 
increase in inequality among the poor. In the last two years under examination all 
indices record a decline. Nevertheless, the values of all indices are higher in 2014 than 
in 2007, but the differences in the proportional increases are substantial. FGT0 is 6.2% 
higher, while FGT1 and FGT2 are 33.2% and 63.2% higher, respectively. 
Graph 3.  Poverty trends, 2007-2014 (2007:100) 
 
 
The pattern is very different when the poverty line used is “anchored”; that is fixed in 
real terms to its value in 2007. In the first couple of years all indices decrease 
substantially, by almost 25% cumulatively. However, in the period 2009-2013 their 
values rise sharply and they only decline a little in 2014. In the end of the period under 
consideration, the values of FGT0, FGT1 and FGT2 are 101.5%, 162.5% and 217.8% 
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higher than in 2007 – a tremendous increase that it is accounted primarily by the decline 
in disposable incomes. 
 
3.2. Changes in the structure of inequality and poverty 
3.2.1. Inequality 
The results of the changes in the structure of inequality are reported in Table 1. For the 
purposes of our analysis, the population is grouped using five criteria. The first criterion 
is the socio-economic group of the household head. The eight groups formed are: Self-
employed with employees, Self-employed without employees in the agricultural sector, 
Self-employed without employees outside agriculture, Private sector employees, Public 
sector employees,10 Unemployed, Pensioners and Other. Columns A and B report the 
group population shares in 2007 and 2014, respectively, while columns C and D show 
the group mean incomes, normalised by the national average of the corresponding year. 
Estimates of MLD are reported in columns E and F (multiplied by 100). As mentioned 
earlier and shown at the bottom of the table, according to MLD inequality increased by 
11.5% between the two years. Below the estimates for each population group there is 
the estimate of inequality that emanates from disparities “within groups” (this is equal 
to the sum of group inequality estimates multiplied by the population share of the 
corresponding group) and the estimate of inequality that emanates from disparities 
“between groups” (this is equal to the value of the inequality index if every population 
member has income equal to his/her group mean income). Column G reports the 
proportional change in inequality between 2007 and 2014 while columns H and I show 
the contribution of each group and the contribution of disparities between groups to 
aggregate inequality. Column I reports the difference in the contributions in the two 
years in percentage points. 
                                                     
10 The distinction between private and public-sector employees is crucial for our analysis. However, 
information about sector of employment (public or private) was not available in our data set. We classified 
as “Public sector employees” those employed in “Public administration, defense and compulsory social 
security” as well as those in “Education” who had permanent contracts; that is the overwhelming majority 
of civil servants. However, a number of public sector employees were classified as private sector 
employees (for example, persons employed in public hospitals or public utilities) while a few private sector 
employees were classified as employed in the public sector (for example, private school teachers with 
permanent contracts). 
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Despite almost two decades of robust growth rates, in the years before the crisis the 
rate of unemployment in Greece was higher than in most European countries. According 
to Eurostat, in 2007 Greece’s unemployment rate was 8.4% versus the EU27 average of 
7.2%. What is even more telling is that in the same year both youth and female 
unemployment rates were the highest among all EU countries; the corresponding rates 
for Greece and the EU being 22.7% vs 15.8% and 12.9% vs 7.9%, respectively. This can 
be considered as a clear indication of a dysfunctional labour market. The main effect of 
the crisis was the spectacular rise in the unemployment rate. By 2014 the 
unemployment rate had climbed to 26.5%. 11This is reflected in our data. Between 2007 
and 2014 the share of the population living in households headed by unemployed 
persons rose from 2.2% to 9.9%. Furthermore, even though the mean income of the 
group was only 64% of the national average in 2007 it dropped to 55% in 2014. This 
should be attributed partly to the fact that between these years long-term 
unemployment shot up (in 2014 around three quarters of the unemployed were long-
term unemployed) and the income protection for this group was almost non-existent. 
Besides the gradual ageing of the population, during the crisis, several people who were 
close to retirement chose to exit the labour market and take early retirement. In our 
data, this is reflected in the rise of persons living in households headed by pensioners 
from 28.9% to 33.7%. However, unlike what is often heard in the public discourse, the 
relative income position of this group rose during the crisis (even though it decreased 
substantially in real terms). In 2007, on average the members of the group had incomes 
5% lower than the population mean. By 2014 their incomes were 6% higher than the 
national average. 
Naturally, the increase in the share of these two groups was counterbalanced by the 
decline on the share of the population living in households with employed heads. This is 
evident in columns A and B, but the effect was not symmetric for all groups. One 
distinguishing feature of the Greek labour market is the large share of the self-employed. 
According to Eurostat, the share of the self-employed among all employed persons in 
Greece is by far the largest in the EU.  
 
                                                     
11 It had peaked one year earlier at 27.5%. 
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Table 1.  Structure of inequality, 2007 and 2017 
Population Group 
Population share Mean income Inequality (MLD) 
Change 
% 
Contribution 
% 
Change 
2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014  2007 2014  
A B C D E F G H I J 
Socio-economic group of household head                     
Self-employed with employees 7.3 4.5 1.35 1.35 33.3 28.7 -14.1 13.3 6.3 -7.0 
Self-employed without employees (agriculture) 5.8 5.0 0.65 0.66 14.2 19.7 39.5 4.5 4.8 0.3 
Self-employed without employees (non-agriculture) 3.6 3.3 1.00 1.04 27.3 26.6 -2.4 5.4 4.4 -1.1 
Employee (private sector) 31.4 24.7 1.01 1.06 15.7 17.9 13.6 27.2 21.7 -5.5 
Employee (public sector) 9.4 8.3 1.24 1.27 7.6 8.9 16.1 4.0 3.6 -0.3 
Unemployed 2.2 9.9 0.64 0.55 22.2 28.7 29.2 2.6 14.0 11.4 
Pensioner 28.9 33.7 0.95 1.06 13.9 12.8 -7.8 22.1 21.4 -0.7 
Other 11.4 10.7 0.91 0.90 21.4 21.8 2.1 13.4 11.6 -1.8 
    “Within groups”        16.8 17.8 5.7 92.6 87.8 -4.8 
    “Between groups”         1.4 2.5 84.0 7.4 12.2 4.8 
Households with/without unemployed                     
No unemployed household member 88.1 68.4 1.03 1.13 17.8 16.8 -5.4 86.2 56.9 -29.3 
At least one unemployed household member 11.9 31.6 0.78 0.73 17.8 21.5 20.6 11.7 33.5 21.8 
    “Within groups”         17.8 18.3 2.9 97.9 90.4 -7.5 
    “Between groups”         0.4 2.0 409.2 2.1 9.6 7.5 
Household type                     
One person 65- or childless couple (both 65-) 10.4 12.1 1.18 1.15 20.6 22.9 11.2 11.8 13.7 1.9 
One person 65+ or childless couple (at least one 65+) 12.8 16.1 0.86 1.00 14.5 11.7 -19.4 10.2 9.3 -0.9 
Couple with 1 or 2 dependent children 31.9 26.0 1.02 1.04 20.1 24.5 22.3 35.3 31.5 -3.9 
Couple with 3+ dependent children 2.3 5.5 0.90 0.78 21.7 19.4 -11.0 2.7 5.2 2.5 
Mono-parental household 1.8 2.1 0.84 0.77 17.6 18.7 6.6 1.7 1.9 0.2 
Other household type with no dependent children 26.9 22.3 1.06 1.06 14.9 17.9 20.0 22.0 19.7 -2.4 
Other household type with at least one dependent child 13.9 16.0 0.86 0.83 17.3 19.5 12.7 13.2 15.3 2.1 
    “Within groups”       17.7 19.6 11.0 97.1 96.7 -0.4 
    “Between groups”       0.5 0.7 28.2 2.9 3.3 0.4 
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(continued) 
 
Population Group 
Population 
share 
Mean income 
Inequality 
(MLD) 
Change 
% 
Contribution 
% 
Change 
2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014  2007 2014  
A B C D E F G H I J 
Age of household member                     
Up to 17 16.5 16.5 0.98 0.93 20.3 23.9 17.9 18.4 19.5 1.1 
18-64 64.4 61.4 1.04 1.02 18.6 21.9 18.0 65.8 66.3 0.5 
65 or over 19.1 22.1 0.88 1.01 13.9 12.8 -8.4 14.6 13.9 -0.7 
    “Within groups”         18.0 20.2 12.5 98.8 99.7 0.9 
    “Between groups”         0.2 0.1 -75.5 1.2 0.3 -0.9 
Education level of household head                     
Tertiary education 20.2 24.8 1.54 1.41 16.4 16.6 1.4 18.1 20.3 2.1 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 3.2 4.8 1.14 1.03 16.9 17.1 0.9 3.0 4.0 1.0 
Upper secondary education 29.1 31.2 0.98 0.94 14.1 19.7 40.4 22.5 30.3 7.8 
Lower secondary education 10.1 10.7 0.83 0.78 16.1 19.8 22.9 9.0 10.5 1.5 
Primary education  29.7 23.6 0.78 0.80 13.0 15.7 20.8 21.2 18.3 -2.9 
Less than primary education 7.7 5.0 0.67 0.72 12.3 12.2 -1.0 5.3 3.0 -2.3 
    “Within groups”         14.4 17.5 21.8 79.1 86.3 7.3 
    “Between groups”         3.8 2.8 -27.5 20.9 13.7 -7.3 
GREECE 100.0 100.0 1.00 1.00 18.2 20.3 11.5       
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The corresponding shares in Greece was 28.9% in 2007 and, despite a substantial decline 
in the number of self-employed in absolute terms, rose to 31.2% in 2014, versus 15.0% 
in EU27 in both years, using Eurostat figures. Reflecting the small size of the average 
Greek firm, the share of self-employed with employees among all employed persons 
was substantially higher in Greece than in the EU27 (8.0% vs 4.5%). The effects of the 
crisis on small firms were devastating and the number of self-employed with employees 
declined by almost 40% in the period under examination. Nevertheless, their share 
among the employed in 2014 was still much higher than the EU27 average (6.3% vs 
4.3%). These changes are also reflected in columns A and B. The shares of the population 
living in all types of households headed by employed persons declined – far more so 
those for those headed by self-employed with employees and private sector employees. 
The relative mean incomes of these groups in comparison to the national average did 
not changes considerably during the crisis, with population members living in 
households headed by self-employed with employees and public sector employees 
being substantially above the national average, while those living in households headed 
by self-employed in the agricultural sector had monetary incomes below two thirds of 
the national average (however, unlike the rest of the population, they are likely to have 
in-kind incomes in the form of consumption of own agricultural production).12 
Moving to the columns related to inequality, it can be noted that the group of members 
of households headed by unemployed persons is the only group that increased 
substantially its contribution to aggregate inequality in the period under examination. 
This is a consequence of both a rise in its population share and the level of inequality 
within the group. On the contrary, the contribution of the rather heterogeneous group 
of population members living in households headed by self-employed with employees 
and private sector employees decline, primarily because of the declines in the 
population shares of these groups. Interestingly enough, despite the large increase in its 
population share, the contribution of the group of population members living in 
                                                     
12 The evidence of the first four columns of the first panel of Table 1 seems to run contrary to two popular 
myths used in the public discourse: (a) that during the crisis there was a substantial migration of 
unemployed persons from urban areas to rural areas in order to get involved in agricultural activities, and, 
(b) that although public sector employees did not experience unemployment, they paid a very high price 
since their salaries were reduced far more than private sector salaries, with obvious consequences for 
their living standards in relative terms. 
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households headed by pensioners declines marginally. This should be attributed to the 
decline in the level of inequality within the group, especially vis-à-vis the national 
average. Further, the contribution of “between socio-economic groups” disparities to 
aggregate inequality rises very substantially. Whereas such disparities were accounting 
for 7.4% of aggregate inequality in 2007, their contribution rose to 12.2% in 2014. To a 
large extent, the evidence of the first panel of Table 1 is the key to understand several 
of the changes reported in the remaining of the table, as well as changes reported in 
Table 2. 
The second panel of the table is, essentially, a companion to the first panel. As noted 
earlier, a very large proportion of the unemployed are not household heads and there 
are many households with unemployed members. In this panel the partitioning criterion 
is the presence of at least one unemployed member in the household. In 2007 11.9% of 
the population was living in households with at least one unemployed member. By 2014 
this figure had risen to 31.6%. Moreover, the relative mean income of this group 
declined from 78% to 73% of the mean national income and disparities within the group 
rose considerably. As a consequence, the contribution of the group to aggregate 
inequality almost tripled (from 11.7% to 33.5%) while the contribution of the “between-
groups” component in this partition of the population increased from 2.1% to 9.6%. 
In the third panel of the table, the population is split according to the household type of 
the individual into seven groups: “younger” single member households or couples with 
both members aged below 65, “older” single member households and couples with at 
least one member aged 65 or more, couples with “one or two” and “three or more” 
dependent children and no other household members, mono-parental households and 
other household types “with” or “without” dependent children. As noted earlier during 
the period under consideration the population of Greece declined by 2.4%. This was a 
consequence of population ageing and especially, for the first time since the mid-1970s, 
net emigration. More specifically, according to Eurostat, in the first three years of the 
period under consideration, 2007-2009, there was a net inflow of around 60 thousand 
immigrants to Greece. In the next five years, 2010-2014, slightly more than half a million 
persons emigrated from Greece (many of them former immigrants to the country) and 
the net outflow was approximately 208 thousand persons. The great majority of the 
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emigrants were working age individuals, mainly young and relatively well educated. 
Partly as a result of this emigration of relatively young persons, a sharp drop is observed 
in the number of births in the country between 2007 (112 thousand) and 2014 (92 
thousand). 
Naturally, these changes are reflected in the demographic structure of the population 
reported in the third panel of Table 1. Fewer people were living in households with 
dependent children in 2014 than in 2007 (especially in households with one or two 
children) and there was a substantial increase in the share of elderly households (single 
member households or couples with at least one member aged 65 or more). In line with 
earlier findings, the relative income position of the latter group improves substantially 
(in 2007 their mean income was 14% lower than the national average, whereas in 2017 
they were on parity). On the contrary, the relative income position of the small but 
vulnerable groups of mono-parental households and, especially, households with three 
or more children deteriorates further between the two years (possibly an indication that 
unemployment affected disproportionately these types of households). As regards the 
structure of inequality, in both years it appears to emanate primarily from differences 
“within-groups”, with “between-groups” disparities accounting for just around 3% of 
aggregate inequality. 
In the fourth panel of the table, the population is grouped according to the age of the 
population member into “young” (below 18), “working age” (18-64) and “old” (65 or 
over). Two points are worth-making and they are also in line with earlier findings. First 
the substantial increase – in such a short period of time - in the share of the old (by 3%) 
and the corresponding decline in the share of the working age population. Second, the 
substantial improvement in the relative income position of the elderly who in 2007 were 
12% below the national average but in 2014 moved marginally above it. With respect to 
the structure of inequality, disparities “between-groups” play an insignificant role in the 
determination of aggregate inequality in both years. 
In the last panel of the table, the population is partitioned according to the education 
level of the household head. Since the early 1990s, tertiary education and, to a lesser 
extent, post-secondary non-tertiary education expanded rapidly in Greece. This is 
reflected in the population shares reported in columns A and B. The shares of the 
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population living in households headed by persons with such educational qualifications 
rose from 20.2% to 24.8% and from 3.2% to 4.8%, respectively. Likewise, the share of 
persons living in households headed by upper secondary education graduates rose, 
whereas the share of the population living in households headed by persons with low 
educational qualifications (persons who completed only primary education or who did 
not even reach this level) experienced a notable decline. Substantial changes are 
observed in the relative mean incomes of the groups between the two years. The 
relative income position of the two lowest education groups rose, while that of the rest 
of the population deteriorated, sometimes substantially. This is also in line with earlier 
findings. The overwhelming majority of members of households headed by persons with 
low educational qualifications are old, probably pensioners, likely to live alone or with 
their spouses. Between the two years inequality rose substantially within the groups of 
households headed by persons with middle educational qualifications. This is probably 
due to the fact that these educational groups were hit particularly hard by 
unemployment during the crisis. A number of studies cited in the introductory section 
of the paper report that education is probably the factor most closely associated with 
inequality, accounting for between a fifth and a quarter of aggregate inequality 
(“between education groups” inequality). Such estimates are in line with the 2007 figure 
(20.9%). However, during the crisis and as a result of the aforementioned changes in 
relative group incomes, population shares and inequality within specific groups, there 
was a very substantial decline in the contribution of inequality “between education 
groups”, by 7.3 percentage points, so that such disparities accounted for only 13.7% of 
aggregate inequality in 2014. 
 
3.2.2. Poverty 
Table 2 presents changes in the structure of poverty between 2007 and 2014. The 
composition of the population groups in the various population partitions is the same as 
in Table 1. Columns A and B show the estimates of FGT0 (poverty rate) for the various 
groups in 2007 and 2014 using contemporaneous (“floating”) poverty lines, set at 60% 
of the median equivalised income of the population in the corresponding year. As shown 
at the bottom of the table, in 2007 19.8% of the population was falling below the poverty 
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line, while by 2014 this percentage had risen to 21.1% (6.2% increase in proportional 
terms). 13Column C reports poverty rate estimates for 2014 when the poverty line is not 
“floating” (contemporaneous), but “anchored” to its 2007 value in real purchasing 
power terms, inflating it by the estimates of the Consumer Price Index. Using this 
poverty line, almost four in ten population members, 39.6%, are classified as “poor” 
(doubling the rate in comparison with 2007). Columns D, E and F report the 
corresponding contributions to aggregate poverty of each population group according 
to each partition (group poverty estimate multiplied by the population share and divided 
by the estimate for the entire population).  
As noted earlier, despite its popularity, the poverty rate (FGT0) cannot be considered as 
a satisfactory poverty indicator, since it ignores both the average intensity of poverty in 
each group (group mean distance from the poverty line) and the extent of inequality in 
the distribution of income among the poor. FGT2 does not suffer from such 
disadvantages and, further, like FGT0, it is additively decomposable – something that 
explains its popularity in empirical poverty studies. Estimates of FGT2 for 2007 and 2014 
using floating poverty lines are reported in columns G and H. As noted earlier, using this 
approach, (relative) poverty in 2014 appears to be 63.2% higher than in 2007. The 
corresponding contributions to aggregate poverty are reported in columns I and J.14 
Starting from the first panel of Table 1, the estimates reported in column A reveal that 
in 2007 there were two population groups with poverty rates exceeding the national 
average by a wide margin: members of households headed by self-employed without 
employees in the agricultural sector (43.5%) and unemployed persons (40.1%). 
Nevertheless, the estimates of column D show that due to their small population shares, 
the contributions of these groups to the aggregate poverty rate were small. The bulk of 
the poor could be found in households headed by pensioners (27.1%) and private sector 
employees (25.7%). By 2014 the situation was very different. The poverty rate of the 
group of persons living in households headed by unemployed individuals rose to 56.2%, 
while that of the members of households headed by pensioners dropped from 18.6% to 
                                                     
13 Note that these rates are marginally lower than those reported by Eurostat, 20.1% and 21.4% 
respectively, due to the top and bottom coding procedure applied in our paper. 
14 Estimates of poverty decompositions based on all poverty indices used in our analysis (FGT0, FGT1 and 
FGT2) using both “floating” and “anchored” poverty lines are available from the authors on request. 
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11.9%. As a consequence, and combined with the changes in the population shares, 
there was a dramatic change in the composition of the poor. In 2014 the most important 
contributor to aggregate poverty was the group of persons living in households headed 
by unemployed (26.5%), while, despite the increase in its population share, the 
contribution of the group of individuals living in households headed by pensioners 
dropped to 19.1%. At the other extreme, in both years poverty appears to be a rare 
phenomenon in households headed by public sector employees. 
When the “anchored” poverty line is used, the poverty rate of all population groups 
appears to be higher in 2014 in comparison with 2007 by a wide margin. 75.2% of the 
members of households headed by unemployed persons and 69.8% of the members of 
households headed by self-employed without employees in the agricultural sector fall 
below this poverty line (as well as almost half of the members of the heterogeneous 
“Other” group). As regards the contributions to aggregate poverty, once again members 
of households headed by pensioners are the main contributors, even though their 
poverty rate (31.7%) is lower than the national average (39.6%). This should be 
attributed to the large population share of the group as well as to the fact that almost 
one fifth of the group (19.8%) is located between the “floating” and the “anchored” 
poverty line in 2014. 
Turning to the estimates derived using FGT2, the most “complete” index of poverty used 
in the paper, it can be noticed that the relative rankings of the groups in columns G and 
H is relatively similar with those reported in columns A and B, albeit with more marked 
quantitative differences between groups – broadly in line with the group mean incomes 
and their evolution reported in Table 1. In both cases, two groups stand out as high 
poverty risk groups: members of households headed by self-employed in agriculture and 
members of households headed by unemployed persons. 
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Table 2.  Structure of poverty, 2007 and 2014 
 
Population Group 
FGT0 
FGT0  
(% contributions) 
FGT2 
FGT2 
(% contributions) 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2014 
Anch. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2014 
Anch. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Socio-economic group of household head                     
Self-employed with employees 19.7 16.6 29.2 7.2 3.5 3.3 2.97 3.23 9.5 3.9 
Self-employed without employees (agriculture) 43.5 43.3 69.8 12.7 10.2 8.7 5.00 7.69 12.8 10.3 
Self-employed without employees (non-agriculture) 30.1 26.2 44.0 5.5 4.1 3.7 4.15 4.28 6.6 3.8 
Employee (private sector) 16.2 17.7 35.6 25.7 20.7 22.2 1.78 2.53 24.6 16.9 
Employee (public sector) 3.0 2.9 14.7 1.4 1.1 3.1 0.26 0.21 1.1 0.5 
Unemployed 40.1 56.2 75.2 4.3 26.5 18.8 9.36 15.61 8.8 41.7 
Pensioner 18.6 11.9 31.7 27.1 19.1 26.9 1.37 1.13 17.3 10.2 
Other 27.7 29.0 49.2 15.9 14.8 13.3 3.84 4.42 19.2 12.8 
Households with/without unemployed 
          
No unemployed household member 18.6 14.1 30.4 82.6 45.7 52.5 1.92 1.91 74.3 35.1 
At least one unemployed household member 28.9 36.2 59.5 17.4 54.3 47.5 4.90 7.62 25.6 64.9 
Household type                     
One person 65- or childless couple (both 65-) 16.6 19.7 32.1 8.7 11.3 9.8 2.22 3.80 10.2 12.4 
One person 65+ or childless couple (at least one 65+) 23.8 12.7 32.8 15.4 9.8 13.4 1.56 1.05 8.8 4.6 
Couple with 1 or 2 dependent children 19.9 21.7 40.8 32.1 26.8 26.7 2.58 4.56 36.3 32.0 
Couple with 3+ dependent children 30.3 31.6 55.1 3.5 8.2 7.6 3.38 5.62 3.4 8.3 
Mono-parental household 26.4 32.5 52.5 2.4 3.2 2.8 3.33 5.98 2.6 3.3 
Other household type with no dependent children 13.8 18.1 33.2 18.7 19.2 18.7 1.57 2.87 18.5 17.2 
Other household type with at least one dependent child 27.5 28.4 52.3 19.2 21.6 21.1 3.31 5.17 20.2 22.2 
Age of household member 
          
Up to 17 22.7 27.0 47.9 18.9 21.2 20.0 2.90 5.20 21.0 23.2 
18-64 18.3 22.0 39.5 59.5 64.3 61.3 2.33 4.17 65.8 69.1 
65 or over 22.5 13.8 33.6 21.6 14.5 18.7 1.57 1.31 13.1 7.8 
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(continued) 
Population Group 
FGT0 
FGT0  
(% contributions) 
FGT2 
FGT2 
(% contributions) 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2007 
Anch. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2007 
Anch. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
2007 
Float. 
2014 
Float. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Education level of household head 
          
Tertiary education 5.4 7.7 18.4 5.5 9.0 11.5 0.77 1.18 6.8 7.9 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 13.6 20.2 37.4 2.2 4.6 4.5 1.19 2.51 1.7 3.2 
Upper secondary education 15.0 22.3 40.0 22.1 33.1 31.4 1.75 4.45 22.4 37.3 
Lower secondary education 26.6 28.9 56.7 13.6 14.7 15.4 3.75 5.87 16.7 17.0 
Primary education  28.7 28.5 50.9 42.9 32.0 30.3 2.79 4.49 36.5 28.6 
Less than primary education 35.2 28.2 55.2 13.8 6.6 6.9 4.69 4.47 16.0 6.0 
GREECE 19.8 21.1 39.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.27 3.71 100.0 100.0 
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Nonetheless, in 2007 in column A, using FGT0 poverty appears to be higher in the former 
than in the latter group, whereas according to FGT2 in column G the estimate for the 
latter group is almost twice as high as that of the former group. Apparently, extreme 
poverty was more common in the latter group. In fact, in both years, the FGT2 estimates 
for the former group were a little more than twice as high as the national average, 
whereas for the latter they were more than four times the national average. Looking at 
the contributions to aggregate poverty, it is stunning to report that in 2014 the group of 
members of households headed by unemployed persons that accounted for less than 
10% of the total population contributed over 40% to aggregate poverty (41.7%). At the 
other extreme, the contribution of households headed by public sector employees 
(population share 8.3%) was almost non-existent (0.5%) while that of the group of 
households headed by pensioners, with a population share of 33.7% was just 10.2%. 
A similar picture emerges in the second panel of the table where the population is 
grouped according to the existence of unemployed members in the household. In both 
years, the group of individuals living in households with unemployed members was 
facing a markedly higher poverty risk than the rest of the population, irrespective of the 
poverty indicator or the type of poverty line used. Both relative risks vis-à-vis the 
national averages and contributions of the group to aggregate poverty rose markedly in 
2014. As a result, this group, which included a little less than a third of all population 
members in 2014 accounted for around half of the poor and almost two thirds of the 
recorded poverty (64.9%) when using FGT2 and a “floating” poverty line. 
In the next panel of Table 2, where the sample is split according to household type, the 
first two columns show that in both years the poverty rate of couples with three or more 
children, mono-parental households and “other household types with at least one 
dependent child” was higher than the national average and, in fact, their poverty rates 
rose between the two years (especially for the small group of mon-parental 
households). The most notable change between 2007 and 2014 is recorded in the group 
of “one person aged 65 or more or couple with at least one aged 65 or more”. The 
poverty rate of the group was higher than the national average in 2007 but substantially 
lower in 2014. As a result, despite the increase in its population share from 12.8% to 
16.1% between the two years, its contribution to the aggregate poverty rate declined 
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from 15.4% to 9.8%. In both years the majority of the poor can be found in the group of 
households with one or two dependent children and no other household member. This 
is a consequence of its large population share, since in both years its poverty rate is close 
to the national average. When anchored poverty lines are used in the distribution of 
2014, more than half of the members of each of the three aforementioned high-risk 
groups fall below the poverty line, while the contributions of the various groups to 
aggregate poverty are somewhere between the contributions for 2007 and 2014 using 
floating poverty lines. When the FGT2 is used instead of FGT0, the pattern is similar but 
the differences between population groups appear to be a bit starker, with one 
exception. The estimate of FGT2 for the group “one person aged 65 or more or couple 
with at least one aged 65 or more” is lower than the national average in 2007 and, unlike 
the other groups, it declined markedly between the two years. As a consequence, its 
contribution to aggregate poverty in 2014 is just 4.6%. 
These results are also confirmed by the results in the fourth panel, where the 
partitioning criterion is the age of the population member. Naturally, the poverty 
estimates of the large population group of working age individuals (aged 18-64) is close 
to the national average. Between 2007 and 2014 we observe an increase in the poverty 
risks of the youth and a substantial decline in the poverty risks of the elderly. As a 
consequence, the youth, with a population share of 16.5% in 2014, contribute 20.0% to 
aggregate poverty according to FGT0 and an anchored poverty line, 21.2% using the 
FGT0 and a floating poverty line and 23.2% using the FTG2 and a floating poverty line. 
On the contrary, the elderly, with a population share of 22.1% contribute 18.7%, 14.5% 
and 7.8%, respectively; another indication that extreme poverty was not likely to be very 
common among the older segment of the population. 
Finally, in the last panel of the table, the population is split according to the education 
level of the household head. Several of the studies cited in the introductory section 
report that in Greece, as in most other countries, poverty is closely associated with low 
educational qualifications. This result is confirmed to a considerable extent in 2007. 
Column A shows that the poverty rate was declining with the education level of the 
household head. With the exception of a reversal in the positions of the groups “Lower 
secondary education” and “Primary education”, this is also confirmed in column G using 
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FGT2. However, the picture is far more blurred in 2014. The estimates reported in 
column B suggest that the differences in the poverty rates of the three lowest 
educational groups are negligible – and not much higher than the rates of the next two 
groups. Only the members of households headed by university graduates seem to face 
a relatively low risk of falling below the poverty line. The same picture is retained, but 
with higher poverty rates, when an anchored poverty line is used for 2014. However, 
when we move to FGT2 the picture changes. The estimates for “Upper secondary 
education”, Primary education” and “Less than primary education” are virtually 
indistinguishable and higher than the estimate for the entire population, whereas that 
of “Lower secondary education” is almost 60% higher than it. In 2007 the combined 
population share of the two lowest educational groups was 37.4% and their contribution 
to aggregate poverty according to FGT2 was 52.5%. By 2014 their population share had 
declined by 8.8 percentage points to 28.6% whereas their contribution to aggregate 
poverty declined by 17.9 percentage points to 34.6%. On the contrary, the contribution 
of “Upper secondary education” rose from 22.4% to 37.3% on a marginally larger 
population share. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The paper examined developments in the levels of inequality and poverty in Greece 
during the recent crisis and compared their structures before and close to the peak of 
the crisis, using information from EU-SILC. During the period under examination, 2007-
2014, there was a decline in the income shares of the two lowest and the top decile. As 
a result, indices sensitive to the existence of very low incomes record a substantial 
increase in inequality, while indices that are relatively more sensitive to changes in the 
middle or the top of the distribution record a more modest increase in inequality (or, 
even, decline). Relative poverty, measured using “floating” poverty lines recorded an 
increase that appears to be quite substantial when distribution-sensitive poverty indices 
are utilised. Taking into account that disposable income declined by almost 40% in the 
period under examination, it is not surprising to find that poverty using “anchored” 
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poverty lines shot up. Depending on the index and its sensitivity to the existence of very 
low incomes, the estimated poverty indices rose between 100% and 200%. 
Changes in the structure of inequality and, particularly, poverty were driven primarily 
by the enormous increase in unemployment. Regarding its structure, both before and 
during the crisis inequality emanated primarily from differences “within” rather than 
“between” population groups. During the crisis, the importance of differences between 
socio-economic groups in shaping aggregate inequality rose, while that of differences 
between educational groups declined. With respect to the structure of poverty, the 
effects of the increase in unemployment are evident in every partitioning of the 
population. On the contrary, despite the decline in their income in absolute terms during 
the crisis, the pensioners improved considerably their relative position and their 
contribution to aggregate poverty declined substantially – on the flip side of the coin, 
there were increases in the contributions of households with children and better 
educated households. 
What are the driving forces behind the observed changes? The explanation can, 
probably, be found in Greece’s social model. Greece was arguably the most typical case 
of “Mediterranean male-breadwinner welfare state” in the “old” EU member-states. 
According to the OECD, Greece’s labour market lacked flexibility. Youth and female 
unemployment rates were the highest in the EU, but for as long as at least one family 
member – usually, the male breadwinner – had a formal attachment to the labour 
market, there was internal redistribution of resources within the family and, hence, 
strong family ties were acting as a social shock absorber. Even though welfare spending 
as a share of GDP rose sharply in the years before the crisis,15 it was directed mainly to 
pensions – several of them low level but actuarially over-compensating minimum or 
early retirement pensions. The redistributive effects of welfare spending in reducing 
poverty and inequality were marginal in comparison to other EU countries and Greece’s 
levels of inequality and poverty were among the highest in the EU. 
                                                     
15 According to Eurostat, the share of social welfare protection in GDP rose from 18.5% in 1995 to 26.6% 
in 2009. The rise continued in the first years of the crisis and in 2012 Greece’s social welfare spending was 
the third highest in the EU. 
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The limitations of this system became evident when the crisis erupted. Many household 
heads lost their jobs and a considerable proportion of the population was left with 
limited or even zero financial resources. Unemployment insurance was flat, inadequate 
and provided for a limited period of time, long-term unemployment assistance was 
almost non-existent and Greece was one of the very few members of the EU without a 
benefit of last resort, that is, a Minimum Income Guarantee scheme. Unsurprisingly, the 
experience of the crisis for several households with unemployed heads and/or 
unemployed members was a free fall without a safety net. This partly explains the sharp 
increase in the contributions of these groups to aggregate inequality and aggregate 
poverty when indices sensitive to the existence of very low incomes are utilised.  
The only segment of the population with a minimum income guarantee in place was the 
pensioners. Through the combination of actuarially over-compensating minimum 
pensions,16 social solidarity pensions for old-age uninsured individuals and social 
solidarity supplements for low-income pensioners (EKAS), extreme poverty was 
uncommon among the elderly. This is the reason that even though before the crisis the 
poverty rate of the pensioner households was marginally lower than the national 
average, when the distribution-sensitive FGT2 index is used the estimate for the group 
was around 60% of the national average. During the crisis, there were cuts in pensions. 
However, unlike what is often heard in the public discourse, the cuts in pensions were 
far lower than the decline in average incomes. This is evident in the substantial 
improvement of pensioner household incomes in relative terms during the crisis. 
Moreover, cumulatively and also unlike what is often heard in the public discourse, the 
cuts in pensions were anything but uniform. High pensions were cut proportionally far 
more than low-level pensions. This explains the decline in inequality among pensioner 
households during the crisis. 
A number of measures aimed to mitigate the effects of the crisis were taken, but always 
under a very hard budget constraint. Some of these measures were one-off whenever 
financial resources were available (for example, “social dividend”), some of them were 
                                                     
16 Note, however, that as Leventi (2015) demonstrates, under reasonable assumptions, almost all 
pensions in Greece before the crisis were over-compensating, in comparison with the social insurance 
contributions paid by employers and employees. 
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more structural in nature (for example, introduction of income-related family benefits, 
unemployment assistance for long-term unemployed workers and unemployment 
insurance for the self-employed). Further a scheme for the introduction of a generalised 
Minimum Income Guarantee scheme was also piloted during the period under 
examination. At the same time, many measures were taken to liberalize the labour 
market, in the expectation that they will boost employment. A number of simulation 
studies (see, for example, Matsaganis et al, 2017) seem to suggest that several of these 
measures had the intended effects but they were “too little, too late”. 
 
 
28 
References 
Anand S. (1983) Inequality and poverty in Malaysia: Measurement and decomposition, 
Oxford University Press, New York etc. 
Andriopoulou E. and Tsakloglou P. (2011) “The Determinants of Poverty Transitions in 
Europe and the Role of Duration Dependence”, IZA Discussion Paper 5692. 
Andriopoulou E. and Tsakloglou P. (2015) “Once poor, always poor? Do initial conditions 
matter? Evidence from the ECHP”, in T.I. Garner and K.S. Short (eds) Research on 
Economic Inequality Vol. 23 "Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation, and Economic 
Mobility", Emerald, Bingley, pp 23-70. 
Andriopoulou E., Papadopoulos F. and Tsakloglou P. (2013) Poverty and social exclusion in 
Greece: Overlaps and differentiations, INE-GSEE, Athens (in Greek) 
Artelaris, P. and Kandylis G. (2014) “Mapping poverty at regional level in Greece”, Region 
et Developpement 39, pp 131-147. 
Cowell F. (2011) Measuring Inequality, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Deaton A.S. (1993) Understanding consumption, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Foster J.E. (1984) "On economic poverty: A survey of aggregate measures", in R.L. Basmann 
and G.F. Rhodes (eds) Advances in Econometrics Vol. 3, JAI Press, Greenwich, pp 215-
251. 
Foster J.E., J. Greer and E. Thorbecke (1984) “A class of decomposable poverty measures”, 
Econometrica 52, pp 761-766. 
Heady C., Mitrakos T. and Tsakloglou P. (2001) “The distributional impact of social transfers 
in the EU: Evidence from the ECHP”, Fiscal Studies 22, pp 547-565. 
Kanellopoulos C.N. (1986) Incomes and poverty in Greece: Determining factors, Center of 
Planning and Economic Research, Scientific Studies No 22, Athens (in Greek). 
Kaplanoglou G. and Newbery D.M. (2003) “Indirect Taxation in Greece: Evaluation and 
Possible Reform”, International Tax and Public Finance 10, pp 511–533 
Kaplanoglou G. and Newbery D.M. (2008) “Horizontal Inequity and Vertical Redistribution 
with Indirect Taxes: The Greek Case”, Fiscal Studies 29, pp 257–284. 
Kaplanoglou G.  (2015) “Who Pays Indirect Taxes in Greece? From EU Entry to the Fiscal 
Crisis”, Public Finance Review 43, pp 529 – 556 
Kaplanoglou G. and Rapanos V.T. (2016) “Evolutions in consumption inequality and poverty 
in Greece: The impact of the crisis and austerity policies”, Review of Income and Wealth. 
Katsikas, D., Karakitsios A., Filinis, K. and A. Petralias (2015), Social Profile Report on Poverty, 
Social Exclusion and Inequality Before and After the Crisis in Greece, FRAGMEX Research 
Programme Report, Crisis Observatory/ ELIAMEP, Athens.  
Koutsampelas C. and Tsakloglou P. (2013) “The distribution of full income in Greece”, 
International Journal of Social Economics 40, pp 311-330. 
Koutsogeorgopoulou V., Matsaganis M., Leventi C. and Schneider J.D. (2014) “Fairly sharing 
the social impact of the crisis in Greece”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 
1106. 
Lambert P.J. (2002), The distribution and redistribution of income: A mathematical analysis, 
3rd edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
Lazaridis P., Papailias T. and Sakelis M. (1989) The distribution of income in Greece, 
Agricultural Economy Studies No 35, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Athens (in Greek). 
 
 
29 
Leventi C. (2015) “Distributional implications of public policies in Greece”, PhD Dissertation, 
Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of 
Economics and Business. 
Matsaganis M. and Leventi C. (2013) “The distributional impact of the Greek crisis in 2010”, 
Fiscal Studies, 34, pp 83-108. 
Matsaganis M. and Leventi C. (2014a) “Poverty and Inequality during the Great Recession 
in Greece”, Political Studies Review 12, pp 209-223. 
Matsaganis M. and Leventi C. (2014b) “The distributional impact of austerity and the 
recession in Southern Europe”, South European Society and Politics 19, pp 393-412. 
Matsaganis M., Leventi C., Kanavitsa E. and Flevotomou M. (2017) Effective policies for the 
alleviation of extreme poverty, diaNEOsis, Athens (in Greek). 
Mitrakos T. (2014) Inequality, poverty and social welfare in Greece: Distributional effects 
of austerity, Bank of Greece Working Paper 174. 
Mitrakos T. and Tsakloglou P. (2000) “Changes in aggregate inequality and poverty in 
Greece after the restoration of democracy”, Meletes Oekonomikis Politikis 5, 2000, pp 
1-52 (in Greek) 
Mitrakos T. and Tsakloglou P. (2012a) “Inequality, poverty and social welfare in Greece: 
from the restoration of democracy to the current economic crisis”, in Social Policy and 
Social Cohesion in Greece in conditions of economic crisis, Bank of Greece, Athens, pp 
23-63. 
Mitrakos T. and Tsakloglou P. (2012b) “Inequality and poverty in Greece: Myths, realities 
and crisis”, in Anastasakis O. and Singh D. (eds) Reforming Greece: Sisyphean Task or 
Herculean Challenge?, SEESOX Book Series on Current Affairs, Oxford, pp 90-99. 
Papatheodorou C. (1998) “Inequality in Greece: An Analysis by Income Source”, LSE-
STICERD, Distributional Analysis Research Programme Discussion Paper No 39. 
Papatheodorou C. (2006a) “The structure of household income and the distributional 
impact of income taxes and social security contributions”, in E. Mossialos and M. 
Petmesidou (eds) Social Policy in Greece, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 126-143. 
Papatheodorou C. and Petmesidou M. (2006) “Poverty profiles and trends. How do 
southern European countries compare with each other?”, in C. Papatheodorou and M. 
Petmesidou (eds) Poverty and Social Deprivation in the Mediterranean Area, Zed Books, 
London,  pp 47-94. 
Papatheodorou C., Dafermos I., Danchev S. and Marsellou E. (2008) “Economic inequality 
and poverty in Greece: Comparative analysis and inter-temporal trends”, INE-GSEE, 
Athens (in Greek). 
Paschardes P. (1980b) "Income distribution, the structure of consumer expenditure and 
development policy", Journal of Development Studies 16, pp 224-245. 
Paulus A., Sutherland H. and Tsakloglou P. (2010) “The distributional impact of in kind 
public benefits in European countries”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29, 
pp 243–266. 
        Reinhart C.M. and Rogoff K.S. (2009) This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 
Sarris A.H. and Zografakis S. (1993) “Changes in the composition and distribution of income 
in Greece during a period of structural adjustments”, in T. Giannitsis (ed.) 
Macroeconomic management and development bottlenecks, Gutenberg, Athens (in 
Greek).  
 
 
30 
Seidl C. (1988) "Poverty measurement: A survey" in D. Bos, M. Rose and C. Seidl (eds) 
Welfare and efficiency in Public Economics, Springer Verlag, Berlin. 
Sen, A.K. (1995) Inequality reexamined, Harvard University Press. 
Shorrocks A.F. (1980) “The class of additively decomposable inequality measures”, 
Econometrica 48, pp 613-625. 
Tsakloglou P. (1990) "Aspects of poverty in Greece", Review of Income and Wealth 36, pp 
381-402. 
Tsakloglou P. (1992) "Multivariate decomposition of inequality: Greece 1974, 1982", Greek 
Economic Review 14, pp 89-102. 
Tsakloglou P. (1993) "Aspects of inequality in Greece: Measurement, decomposition and 
inter-temporal change: 1974, 1982", Journal of Development Economics 40, pp 53-74. 
Tsakloglou P. (1997) "Changes in inequality in Greece in the 1970s and the 1980s", in P. 
Gottschalk, B. Gustafsson and E. Palmer, (eds) Changing Patterns in the Distribution of 
Economic Welfare. An International Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp 154-183.  
Tsakloglou P. and Mitrakos T. (1997) “An anatomy of inequality: Greece 1988”, Bulletin of 
the International Statistical Institute 57, pp 595-598. 
Tsakloglou P. and Mitrakos T. (1998) “On the distributional impact of excise duties: 
Evidence from Greece”, Public Finance/Finances Publiques 53, pp 78-101. 
Tsakloglou P. and Mitrakos T. (2000) “Decomposing inequality under alternative concepts 
of resources: Greece 1988”, Journal of Income Distribution 8, pp 241-253. 
Tsakloglou P. and Mitrakos T. (2006) “Inequality and Poverty in Greece in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century”, in E. Mossialos and M. Petmesidou (eds) Social Policy in 
Greece, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 126-143. 
Tsakloglou P. and Panopoulou G. (1998) “Who are the poor in Greece? Analysing poverty 
under alternative concepts of resources and equivalence scales”, Journal of European 
Social Policy 8, pp 229-252. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
Previous Papers in this Series 
115. Hatgioannides John, Karanassou Marika, Sala Hector, Karanasos Menelaos, 
Koutroumpis Panagiotis, The Legacy of a Fractured Eurozone: the Greek Dra(ch)ma, 
September 2017  
114. Voskeritsian Horen, Veliziotis Michail, Kapotas Panos, Kornelakis Andreas, 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Social Partners and Reforms in the Wage-Setting 
System in Greece under Austerity, September 2017  
113. Karanasos Menelaos G., Koutroumpis Panagiotis D., Hatgioannides John, 
Karanassou Marika, Sala Hector, The Greek Dra(ch)ma: 5 Years of Austerity. The Three 
Economists' View and a Comment, August 2017  
112. Kiriazis Theo, The European Deposit Insurance in Perspective, August 2017  
111. Chisiridis Konstantinos and Panagiotidis Theodore, The Relationship Between 
Greek Exports and Foreign Regional Income, July 2017  
110. Magioglou Thalia, Representations of Democracy for Young Adults in Greece 
before and during the Crisis: cultural dualism revisited through an over-time 
qualitative study, June 2017  
109. Kammas Pantelis and Sarantides Vassilis,  Democratisation and tax structure: 
Greece versus Europe from a historical perspective, May 2017  
108. Tsekeris Charalambos, Ntali Evdokia, Koutrias Apostolos and Chatzoulis Athena, 
Boomerang Kids in Contemporary Greece: Young People's Experience of Coming Home 
Again, March 2017  
107. Theologos Dergiades, Eleni Mavragani, Bing Pan, Arrivals of Tourists in Cyprus 
Mind the Web Search Intensity, February 2017  
106. Kougias, Konstantinos, ‘Real’ Flexicurity Worlds in action: Evidence from 
Denmark and Greece, January 2017  
105.  Jordaan, Jacob A. and Monastiriotis, Vassilis, The domestic productivity effects 
of FDI in Greece: loca(lisa)tion matters!, December 2016  
 
 
